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Abstract
We begin with an introductory overview of contributions made by more than 
twenty scholars associated with the Philosophy Department at the University 
of Buffalo during the last half-century to our understanding and evaluation of 
Aristotle’s logic. More well-known developments are merely mentioned in order 
to make room to focus on issues at the center of attention from the beginning: 
existential import and, more generally, the analysis of categorical propositions. I 
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institutions, a bibliography of relevant publications by UB scholars, and a bibliog-
raphy of important related works.
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nuestra atención: el importe existencial y, de modo más general, el análisis de las 
proposiciones categóricas. Incluyo una lista de los profesores de la UB, una lis-
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publicaciones relevantes de los profesores de la UB, y una bibliografía de trabajos 
relacionados importantes.
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If you by your rules would measure what with your 
rules doth not agree, forgetting all your learning, 
seek ye first what its rules may be. 
(Richard Wagner, Die Meistersinger)
1. Introductory Overview
Among the things that the University of Buffalo’s Department 
of Philosophy will be remembered for, one of them might be the 
half-century-long tradition of contributing to the understand-
ing of the most important logic book ever written: Aristotle’s 
Prior Analytics. One of the first contributions is William Parry’s 
“Quantification of the Predicate and Many-sorted Logic” in 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (1966). Parry’s paper 
shows how Aristotle’s categorical syllogistic can be faithfully rep-
resented as logic in modern symbolic logic. One of the last con-
tributions to date is a May 2008 lecture that refers to and builds 
on Parry’s paper. That lecture is my own “Aristotle’s Many-sorted 
Logic”, abstracted in the Bulletin of Symbolic Logic (2008).1 It 
would require a book to do justice to the whole subject. In a few 
pages, I will try to give the flavor and scope of the tradition, which 
combined philosophy, classics, logic, mathematics, and history. I 
begin with a general overview and then deal in more detail with 
one issue that occupied several of us including Parry and me for 
several years.
The central figures were George Boger, James Gasser, John 
Kearns, John Mulhern, Mary Mulhern, William Parry, Lynn Rose, 
Michael Scanlan, and me. The group is collectively known as the 
Buffalo Syllogistic Group.2 Many of their ideas were first presented 
in the Buffalo Logic Colloquium, the UB Philosophy Colloquium, 
or in UB seminars and classes. At least three of them originated in 
discussions during or following a colloquium presentation.
UB philosophy scholars have been involved in several dramatic 
changes that have taken place in the half-century beginning around 
1960. Perhaps the most dramatic is that, as the result of efforts of 
several of us and some others, it is no longer generally believed 
that Aristotle’s “syllogistic” was an axiomatic theory −like Euclid’s 
geometry, Peano’s arithmetic, a theory of linear order of points on 
1 This lecture was part of a three-hour “tutorial course” of the Logic School at the Center 
for Logic, Epistemology, and History of Science at the State University of Campinas, 
Sao Paulo, Brazil (cf. Corcoran 2009).
2 For the record, the whole group includes J. Anton, G. Boger, J. Corcoran, N. Garver, J. 
Gasser, J. Glanville, C. S. Gould, E. Hacker, S. Iverson, J. Kearns, D. Levin, L. Mohler, 
J. Mulhern, M. Mulhern, S. Nambiar, W. Parry, J. Richards, L. Rose, M. V. Rorty, J. M. 
Sagüillo, M. Scanlan, J. Swiniarski, D. M. Tress, and R. Zirin.
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a line, or a theory of class inclusion−.3 As incredible as this may 
seem today, before the 1970s, the dominant view was that Aristotle’s 
system was not really an underlying logic: it was thought to be an 
axiomatic theory that presupposed an underlying logic never articu-
lated by Aristotle. This would call into question the view that Aristotle 
was the founder of logic (cf. Smith 1989; Corcoran 1994). How could 
Aristotle be the founder of logic if he never presented a system of 
logic? There were axiomatic theories studied in Plato’s Academy.
Instead, today the dominant view has two main theses. The first 
is that Aristotle’s Prior Analytics articulated a rigorous formal logic 
for deducing conclusions from arbitrarily large premise sets −as are 
encountered in axiomatic mathematics and science−.4 The second 
is that Aristotle had proposed a rule-based natural deduction logic 
as opposed to an axiom-based logic. Both of these points were pio-
neered by UB scholars. George Boger5 titled his chapter in the 2004 
Handbook of the History of Logic, “Aristotle’s Underlying Logic,” 
to proclaim allegiance to this distinctively modern revolutionary 
interpretation.
The new interpretation of Aristotle’s logic emerged indepen-
dently and simultaneously6 in the spring of 1971 in two places in 
different continents: the University of Buffalo and the University 
3 As far as I know the earliest rigorous presentation of the viewpoint was made in 
1929 by Jan Łukasiewicz. A remarkably similar theory was advanced independently 
in 1938 by James Wilkinson Miller. For further discussion, see my 1994 paper. Paul 
Rosenbloom mentions the general idea in 1950 without referencing Łukasiewicz or 
Miller (cf. 196).
4 This first thesis, which was not endorsed or even discussed by Lukasiewicz, has been 
accepted by many scholars who do not accept the second thesis. Barnes is a notable 
example. He describes the syllogistic as an underlying logic (2007, 360) that is used 
to deduce conclusions from arbitrarily many premises, not just the traditional two 
(2007, 364).
5 Boger worked with UB professor John Anton as an undergraduate, and his 1982 
PhD was supervised by William Parry. The second reader was UB professor John 
Glanville.
6 At least two of the systems discussed in my 1974a article were presented at the 
1971 Linguistics Institute: to my summer graduate course “Logic and Linguistics” 
and to the research seminar led by Edward Keenan of UCLA and me. In fact, Peter 
Malcolmson, then a student in the course, discovered the key lemma in the com-
pleteness proof now published in my 1972 JSL paper. Using his research notebooks, 
Timothy Smiley (per. comm.) confirmed the approximate date of his discovery of 
materially the same system in Prior Analytics. For the record, in 1971, when he spent 
the summer at UB, Peter Malcolmson was a graduate student in Mathematics at UC 
Berkeley. He went on to earn a PhD and he is now Professor of Mathematics at Wayne 
State University in Detroit.
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of Cambridge. The question of priority is immaterial.7 The story is 
recounted in my 1994 paper “Founding of Logic”. One of the firm-
est signs that the new Buffalo-Cambridge interpretation was taking 
hold among Aristotle scholars was the publication of a new transla-
tion8 of Aristotle’s Prior Analytics based on it. The translator was 
the accomplished classicist-philosopher Robin Smith, and one of 
the publisher’s readers was Michael Frede, one of the acknowledged 
leaders in the field of Greek logic. 
Another sea change is the increasingly successful defense of 
Aristotle against the once widely held view that Aristotle arbitrarily 
limited logic to the four categorical propositional forms. It had been 
completely obvious, at least as far back as Boole and Peirce, that 
no finite number of propositional forms is sufficient to account 
for the logic in scientific thought. UB logicians, starting with Lynn 
Rose (1968), took Aristotle’s general definition of syllogism literally. 
Smith’s translation reads as follows:
A deduction [syllogismos] is a discourse [logos] in which cer-
tain things having been supposed, and something different from the 
things supposed results of necessity because these things are so. By 
‘because these things are so’, I mean resulting through them, and by 
‘resulting through them’ I mean ‘needing no further term from outsi-
de in order for the necessity to come about’. (APr. A1 24b10-15)
Anchoring their thinking in the bedrock of Aristotle’s defini-
tion, the scholars worked toward establishing the fact that Aristotle’s 
basic viewpoint was not artificially restrictive; rather, it was inten-
tionally broad enough to encompass almost all of the logic that has 
been developed in the two millennia since Aristotle opened logical 
investigations.9 The conclusion explicitly drawn was that Aristotle 
founded logic per se, not just categorical syllogistic.
Once the above framework was in place, UB scholars applied it to 
clarify other issues in the Aristotelian corpus. George Boger used it 
to treat reduction, paradoxes, and invalidity methodology. Michael 
Scanlan10 worked on compactness and, more generally, on Aristotle’s 
discussion of infinite arguments and infinite deductions. 
7 Timothy Smiley’s paper (1973) was completed around the same time as my 1972 paper.
8 No translation was ever based on an interpretation taking syllogisms to be sentences 
−whether universalized conditionals as in Łukasiewicz or of some other form. All 
interpretations took a syllogism to be determined by its premises and its conclusion, 
thereby making it impossible to understand how there could be a direct and an indi-
rect syllogism having the same premises and the same conclusion.
9 This viewpoint is articulated prominently in my latest paper “Aristotle’s Demonstrative 
Logic” (2009).
10 Scanlan completed a 1982 PhD supervised by me with UB professor John Kearns as second 
reader. Scanlan had previously completed an MA with John Anton before coming to UB.
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Today I want to limit myself to a single one of the areas in which 
UB scholars have contributed: Aristotle’s views on the nature of cat-
egorical propositions and, in particular, his view of the existential 
import of universal propositions. For reasons of space, the rest of 
my paper will deal mostly with one part of that issue, namely, the 
existential import of universal categorical propositions and the 
nature of categorical propositions. 
2. Universal Categorical Propositions
Aristotle made it perfectly clear that the universal categorical 
propositions such as “Every rectangle is a rhombus” and “No rect-
angle is a rhombus” were about their respective subjects and pred-
icates, rectangles and rhombuses, not about other things such as 
people, clouds, peas, flowers, promises, regrets, pains, loyalties, etc. 
There is no textual justification to equate a two-term Aristotelian 
universal affirmative such as “Every rectangle is a rhombus” with 
a three-term restrictive-clause universal such as “Every figure 
which is a rectangle is a rhombus” or with a proposition about 
absolutely everything such as “Everything which is a rectangle is a 
rhombus”.11 
The issue of whether the English sentence 
Every rectangle is a rhombus
expresses the same proposition as 
Everything which is a rectangle is a rhombus
or as
Everything is a rectangle if it’s a rhombus
Is hardly relevant to the issue of how Aristotle is to be inter-
preted. It would be interesting to know the history of both issues. 
Who was the first to take a universal affirmative such as “Every rect-
angle is a rhombus” to be about everything? Who was the first to say 
that Aristotle took a universal affirmative such as “Every rectangle 
is a rhombus” to be about everything? There seems to be no reason 
to think that a certain one of these events predated the other.
The fact that a given interpreter of Aristotle thinks that two 
sentences express the same or logically equivalent propositions is 
11 Robin Smith (cf. 1989 xxv) was not the first person to deserve criticism for the mis-
step of taking “Everything which is A is B” as schematic of an Aristotelian universal 
affirmative. It should be “Every A is a B”. There are two mistakes: (1) the Aristotelian 
universal proposition is not about everything and (2) the terms are substantives not 
attributives. Thankfully, he did not make the third error of taking the terms and the 
copula as plurals as “All things which are A are B” or “All A’s are B’s”, a mistake re-
peatedly made by Łukasiewicz (1957 1 2, passim).
john corcor an[104]
Departamento de Filosofía • Facultad de Ciencias Humanas • Universidad Nacional de Colombia
no justification for thinking that Aristotle so treats them or for so 
treating them in an interpretation of Aristotle. A similar rule should 
guide translators dealing with number in the grammatical sense: a 
translator who regards plural and singular grammatical number 
as logically indistinguishable is not thereby justified in translating 
Aristotle’s plural Greek words into singular English words. By the 
way, I know of no disagreement about the fact that “some prime 
number is even” is true, while “some prime numbers are even” is 
false. Likewise, the singular particular affirmative “some prime is 
an even” needs to be distinguished from the corresponding plural 
“some primes are evens”.
For Aristotle, the terms −“rectangle” and “rhombus” in the 
examples− were substantives; they were not attributives such as 
“rectangular” and “rhombic”, nor were they complexes such as 
“every rectangle”, “a rhombus”, and “no rectangle”. For Aristotle, 
the subjects and predicates were syntactically interchangeable in the 
sense that everything serving as a subject also serves as a predicate 
and conversely: if “Every X is a Y” is a categorical proposition so is 
“Every Y is an X”.  Each categorical proposition contained two sub-
stantive terms −“Every quadrangle that is a square is a rectangle”, 
which has three substantives, is not categorical− and no categorical 
proposition contained any attributive terms −“Every quadrangle 
that is square is rectangular” is not categorical. Each categorical 
proposition was about the individuals falling under its terms and 
not about anything else, certainly not everything.12
Yet many modern writers not only took categorical propositions 
to be about absolutely everything; they also took them to have only 
one substantive instead of Aristotle’s two and they took them to 
have two attributives instead of Aristotle’s none: “Every thing that 
is square is rectangular” is not categorical. Moreover, if this was not 
bad enough, the same modern writers took the two universals to be 
propositions that did not carry the information Aristotle took them 
to have. These modern writers not only falsified Aristotle’s view; 
they had the gall to go further and denigrate Aristotle for views 
he never held. The familiar three-step libeling process involves: (1) 
attributing to the victim theses the victim did not hold; (2) exhibit-
ing real or imagined flaws in the theses; and (3) blaming the victim 
for such mistakes. UB logicians were not the first to defend Aristotle 
against such deceptive and unfair attacks.13
12 This misinterpretation of Aristotle’s Prior Analytics was made by Boole and by Frege 
(cf. Corcoran 2004; 2005b).
13 There are many prominent logicians who defended Aristotle against unjust criti-
cism. One I happen to remember at the moment is the Alonzo Church PhD Paul 
Rosenbloom: “A great deal of nonsense has been written even by otherwise competent 
authors on the relation between Boolean algebra and the Aristotelian logic of classes. 
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3. Rebutting the Accusations
Among the spurious theses falsely attributed to Aristotle is the 
false proposition, call it S for ‘spurious’, that all arguments in the 
same form as the following two are valid.
Everything is such that if it is rectangular, then it is rhombic.
Something is such that it is rectangular and it is rhombic.
Everything is such that if it is rectangular, then it is not rhombic.
Something is such that it is rectangular and it is not rhombic. 
Notice that in each case the premise is a universalized condi-
tional and the conclusion is the corresponding existentialized con-
junction. The premise is not transformed into the conclusion merely 
by replacing ‘every’ with ‘some’; it is also necessary to change ‘if…, 
then’ into ‘and’, so to speak.
To see that these are invalid, consider the following two argu-
ments with the universe of discourse limited to figures of plane 
geometry in which nothing is spherical.
Everything is such that if it is spherical, then it is rhombic.
Something is such that it is spherical and it is rhombic.
Everything is such that if it is spherical, then it is not rhombic.
Something is such that it is spherical and it is not rhombic.
In both cases the premises are universal propositions having no 
counterexamples and thus are true. The conclusions are existential 
propositions having no proexamples and thus are false (Cohen-Nagel 
1993 xxv; Corcoran 2005a 205). These two arguments are thus 
invalid, contrary to what was attributed to Aristotle.
The spurious thesis was substituted for the genuinely Aristotelian 
view, called G for ‘genuine’, that the following are valid.
Every rectangle is a rhombus.
Some rectangle is a rhombus.
The fact is that the latter is consistent and can be formulated as a perfectly good de-
ductive science. Many writers interpret Aristotle’s “All As are Bs” by “A is a subset 
of B” and his “Some As are Bs” by “the intersection of A with B is non-empty” for 
arbitrary elements in a Boolean algebra and then find that some of Aristotle’s valid 
moods do not hold. This, they say, shows that his logic is fallacious.  There is, however, 
no reason why this particular interpretation must be accepted as the only one;  rather, 
the consistency of Aristotle’s system and the failure of this interpretation show that 
this one cannot be accepted” (196). With all due respect, Rosenbloom erred in trust-
ing his source to have schematized Aristotle correctly: “All As are Bs” should have 
been “Every A is a B”. Moreover, if the letters stand for substantives, then they cannot 
also stand for proper names of sets as is required by “A is a subset of B”.
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No rectangle is a rhombus.
Some rectangle is not a rhombus.
The premise of the first is obtained from the conclusion by 
replacing ‘some’ with ‘every’; in the second it is more complicated; 
‘some’ is replaced with ‘no’ and the ‘not’ is deleted. Notice that we 
are dealing with the left and right sides of squares14 of opposition; 
these sides are sometimes referred to using the expression ‘subal-
ternate’ or ‘subalternation’. By the way, Frege (1879), at the end of § 
12, implicitly made the substitution of S for G. But, since he was quite 
used to think of subalternation −the deduction of the existential from 
the corresponding universal− as cogent, he did not criticize the sub-
stituted thesis S, even though S was in conflict with his own logic.15 
These issues will below be dealt with in a broader context. 
Before continuing, it is important to note that UB scholars were also 
instrumental in crediting Aristotle with the method of counterar-
guments just used to establish invalidity. Moreover, they were also 
involved in clarifying that this method is a variant of the method 
of countermodels used in modern mathematical logic. Previously, 
some scholars did not know it was there in Prior Analytics;16 oth-
ers, who were perceptive enough to notice its presence, thought 
that it was erroneous and could not be used to establish invalidity.17 
Others, who were perceptive enough to notice its presence and to 
see that it could indeed be used to establish invalidity, either did 
not appreciate its importance or did not see its connection to the 
method of countermodels.
Aristotle’s method was to show a given argument invalid by 
producing a counterargument, an argument in the same logical form, 
having true premises and a false conclusion. This is the only method 
recognized in Prior Analytics, even though other methods must have 
been in use in Plato’s Academy. In the first place, there are arguments 
whose invalidity is transparent: it is obvious that “Something rectan-
gular is rhombic” does not follow from “Nothing is rectangular”. In 
the second place, every argument known to be invalid can be used as 
14 The original formal “square of opposition” that appears in Apuleius admits of in-
definitely many concrete instantiations each of which is naturally called a square of 
opposition. Moreover, schemes analogous to the original square have also been called 
squares of opposition. In particular, every new interpretation of what Aristotle’s cat-
egorical propositions were gives rise to a “new” square of opposition.
15 To the best of my knowledge, Frege never criticized Aristotle, as least not on this 
issue, which is to Frege’s credit. But he never admitted his mistaken acceptance of 
the two invalid arguments. Could his inattention have been a Kuhnian paradigm-
induced blindness?
16 W. D. Ross and G. Patzig are examples that come to mind (cf. Boger 2004).
17 The view of Łukasiewicz is discussed in footnote 16 of Corcoran (1974a).
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a kind of lever or catalyst to recognize other invalidities: in any valid 
one-premise argument, every proposition that implies the premise 
implies the conclusion. But “Nothing is rectangular” implies the 
premise of the first of the two arguments in question without imply-
ing the conclusion. Therefore, the first argument is invalid.
Similarly in the case of the second argument, we observe the fol-
lowing: it is obvious that the conclusion “Something rectangular is 
not rhombic” does not follow from “Nothing is rectangular”, which 
obviously implies the premise. Thus, the second is invalid. The prin-
ciple underlying this application of the method of weakened premises 
is this: nothing that follows from the premises of an invalid argument 
implies the conclusion. In order for a given argument whose conclu-
sion is the conclusion of an invalid argument to be invalid, it is suf-
ficient for the premises of the invalid argument to imply those of the 
given argument.
4. Aristotelian, Boolean, and Modern Logics
Aristotle’s doctrine of existential import includes the thesis that 
every universal proposition implies the corresponding existential: the 
A implies the I, and the E implies the O (cf. Smiley 1962; Mignucci 
2007). One common view is that Aristotle’s doctrine of existential 
import conflicts with modern logic whereas Boole’s doctrine is in 
agreement with it. This view could not be further from truth. First, 
Boole accepted as valid absolutely every argument accepted as valid 
in Aristotle’s system.18 Thus any conflict with modern logic found 
in Aristotle’s logic would be found in Boole’s to the extent that 
Boole’s logic is faithful to his own philosophy. Second, as noted first 
by Smiley and then by Parry, Aristotle’s logic can be translated into 
modern logic so that the fit is exact. If categorical sentences are trans-
lated into many-sorted symbolic logic, according to Parry’s method 
or the other method given below, or any of several other methods,19 
an argument with arbitrarily many premises is valid according to 
Aristotle’s system if and only if its translation is valid according to 
modern standard many-sorted logic. To use mathematical jargon, 
Aristotle’s system can be embedded in modern many-sorted logic. 
As Parry showed in a discussion after a 1973 meeting of the Buffalo 
Logic Colloquium,20 this result can be proved from the combina-
tion of Parry’s insights (cf. 1966 343) with my proof of the complete-
ness of Aristotle’s categorical logic (Corcoran 1972 696-700).
One of the key ideas in many-sorted logic is that it is possible 
(perhaps necessary) to treat substantives and attributives differently: 
18 This has been established in several studies, including my paper “Aristotle’s Prior 
Analytics and Boole’s Laws of Thought” (2003).
19 Other methods of translation can be found in Smiley (1962) and Gupta (1980).
20 Personal communication.
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the logical forms of “Ann is a woman” and “Ben is a man”, which 
are expressed using the common nouns ‘woman’ and ‘man’, are to be 
distinguished from the logical forms of “Ann is female” and “Ben is 
male”, which are expressed using the adjectives ‘female’ and ‘male’. 
The first two use the ‘is’ of identity; the second two use the ‘is’ of 
predication.21 In the early 1970s, a day or two after discussing with 
Parry the evolution of his own thinking on theses matters, following 
a meeting of the Buffalo Logic Colloquium, I found a note from him 
in my department mail box that read: “At the time I did not realize 
that the ‘is’ in ‘Jones is a wise man’ is the ‘is’ of identity and not the 
‘is’ of predication” (Boger et al. 1988). Parry took the sentence ‘Jones 
is a wise man’ to express the proposition “Jones is a man who is wise”, 
with the first ‘is’ for identity and the second for predication.
Parry pioneered taking Aristotelian logic as many-sorted sym-
bolic logic using sortal variables. The ranges of the sortal variables 
are all non-empty as with ordinary one-sorted logic. Each range is 
assigned independently of all others (Church 1956 340; Parry 1966 
342). For example if the sortal variable m ranges over men, “Jones 
is a man”22 could be expressed ‘Jones is some man’, ‘Some man is 
Jones’, ‘There is a man that is identical to Jones’,  ‘There is a man that 
Jones is identical to’ or
 ∃m ( j = m).
Here the sense of ‘man’ is carried by the variable m.  The forced 
non-English reading of ∃m as ‘There exists m’ gives way to the more 
expressive ‘There exists a man m’. In contrast, “Jones is a man”, 
which involves the substantive “man”, and “Jones is wise”, which 
involves the attributive “wise”, would be expressed as follows:
Wj
This takes the letter W for the predicate ‘is wise’ and thus carries 
the sense of the ‘is’ of predication. Wj would mean “is wise + Jones” 
with the standard phonetic pronunciation: dubya jay.  It would 
probably be pedagogically, linguistically, and heuristically more 
effective to reverse the order from Wj to jW. Then ‘jW’ would mean 
“Jones + is wise” and could be read: jay dubya or jay is dubya.23 
21 There is a discussion of the identity/predication distinction and its relevance to inter-
pretations of universal sentences in my Introduction to Boole (2003) and in my paper 
comparing Aristotle and Boole (cf. Corcoran 2003 271ff).
22 This hardly resembles the view in Peano (1889) that takes ‘Jones is a man’ to be a 
sentence with three constituents: ‘Jones’, ‘is a’ and ‘man’, with the first naming Jones 
j, the second expressing the membership relation ε, and the third naming the class of 
humans, say M.  Thus, ‘Jones is a man’ translates as ‘j ε M’.
23 We can thank Frege for reversing the order. He thought that a predicate such as ‘is 
wise’ represents a function such as √: just as ‘√4’ denotes 2, ‘Wj’ denotes the truth-value 
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Then, the proposition expressed by ‘Jones is a wise man’, para-
phrased ‘Jones is such that there exists a wise man m that Jones is 
identical to’ or ‘There exists a man m such that m is wise and Jones 
is m’, could be expressed as follows:
∃m (Wm & j = m)
My next example uses the sortal variables s and p, where s ranges 
over the spheres and p ranges over the polygons. Hilbert uses three 
classes of sortal variables: one for points, one for lines, and one for 
planes.
Every sphere is a polygon.  ∀s∃p s = p
Some sphere is a polygon.  ∃s∃p s = p  
No sphere is a polygon.  ∀s∀p s ≠ p
Some sphere isn’t a polygon. ∃s∀p s ≠ p
Another approach interprets the quantifier phrases ‘for every 
sphere x’ and ‘for some sphere x’ fairly literally as being in the quan-
tifier-noun-variable form taking ‘for every’ and ‘for some’  to indi-
cate universal and existential quantifiers. Then ‘sphere’ indicates 
the domain of quantification, and ‘x’ as the variable ranging over 
the domain. This approach uses range-indicators (corresponding 
to common nouns) with general (non-sortal) variables: Each initial 
occurrence of a variable follows an occurrence of a range indicator or 
“common-noun symbol” that determines the range of the variable 
in each of its subsequent occurrences. Of course, the subsequent 
occurrences of the general variable are bound by the quantifier 
preceding the range indicator. This is reflected in the practice of 
Tarski and others of using variables as pronouns having common 
nouns as antecedents as in “For every number x, x precedes x+1” 
where the first x refers back to number as antecedent. The word 
‘number’ in ‘For every number x’ indicates the range of x in all 
three occurrences. To each range indicator a non-empty set is 
assigned as its “extension”. 
For example, if M is a range-indicator for “man” and x is a gen-
eral variable, “Jones is a man” could be expressed ‘some man x is 
such that Jones is identical to x’ or 
∃Mx ( j = x)
of the proposition it expresses. This viewpoint is rare today even though the notation 
it gave rise to persists. It is similar to other vestiges of long-forgotten errors. We still 
use the word “Indian” for “Native Americans” even though we no longer regard them 
as natives of India. It is remarkable that some people who find “Indian” inappropriate 
are satisfied with the equally idiomatic “Native American”.
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In contrast, as above “Jones is wise” would be expressed: 
Wj
Then, the proposition expressed by ‘Jones is a wise man’, para-
phrased ‘Jones is such that there exists a wise man x that Jones is 
identical to’ or ‘Some man x is such that x is wise and Jones is x’, 
could be expressed as follows.
∃Mx (Wx & j = x)
In my next example, the range indicators are S and P, where S 
indicates “sphere” and P “polygon”.
Every sphere is a polygon.
Every sphere x is a polygon y.
For every sphere x there exists a polygon y such that  x = y.  
        ∀Sx∃Py x = y 
Some sphere is a polygon.
Some sphere x is a polygon y.
For some sphere x there exists a polygon y such that  x = y.  
        ∃Sx∃Py x = y
No sphere is a polygon.
No sphere x is a polygon y.
For no sphere x is there a polygon y such that x is y.
For every sphere x, for every polygon y, x isn’t y.   
 ∀Sx∀Py x ≠ y
Some sphere is not a polygon.
Some sphere x is not any polygon y.
For some sphere x, every polygon y is such that x isn’t y.
There exists a sphere x such that, for every polygon y, x isn’t y.  
        ∃Sx∀Py x ≠ y
Many-sorted logic with sortal variables is prominent in Hilbert 
(1899/1971) and merely described in Hilbert and Ackermann 
(1938/1950 102, Church 339).  Many-sorted logic with range-indica-
tors and non-sortal variables was pioneered by Anil Gupta in his 
book (1980) (cf. Corcoran 1999).
It is not just mathematically oriented symbolic logicians such 
as Parry and Smiley who see the wisdom and justification of using 
many-sorted logic to represent or model Aristotle’s four kinds of cat-
egorical propositions.24 Recently, in his important article “Aristotle 
24 For the record, I do not say that Aristotle’s categorical propositions are expressible us-
ing many-sorted sentences but only that they are logically equivalent to propositions 
so expressible. I agree with Barnes (2007 264f) and many others that each categorical 
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on the Existential Import of Propositions” (2007), the late classicist 
Mario Mignucci said the following:
If somebody is interested in a formal modern counterpart of 
Aristotle’s theory, the best one was offered by Timothy Smiley some 
time ago, and it is based on the idea of adopting a many-sorted logic 
to interpret Aristotelian propositions (2007 134).
 
5. Interpreting and Evaluating Historical Logicians
There are evidently many pairs of propositions expressible with 
any pair of sentences. Consider the following pair:
Every rectangle is a rhombus. 
Some rectangle is a rhombus.
Over the years, sentences similar to these have been taken to 
express propositions in many different forms: Aristotle’s categoricals, 
Ockham’s categoricals, Boole’s equations, class inclusions, two-sorted 
prenexes, one-sorted quantifications, among others.25 The fact that 
the proposition a given person expresses with the first does not imply 
the proposition which that person expresses with the second is no evi-
dence about the relation of the propositions someone else expresses 
with them. 
By the way, understanding a statement does not require know-
ing which proposition was stated and it especially does not require 
being able to categorize the proposition’s logical form. When the 
parent tells the child “Alligators bite”, in order for the child to 
understand the parent, it is not necessary for the child to know that 
the proposition is an indefinite and not a universal or existential. In 
fact, a listener can understand a speaker and yet be mistaken about 
the logical form of the proposition stated. 
Even if we were somehow logically omniscient and could deter-
mine of any pair of propositions whether the first implies the second, 
what would we have to do to determine which propositions a given 
person was expressing? How do we justify a statement to the effect 
that a given person was incorrect about an implication? Aristotle’s 
critics seem not to have asked themselves these questions. There are 
hermeneutic and epistemic issues that have been glossed over.26
Aristotle might have written the first word on logic. He told 
us: “[…] regarding deduction we had absolutely no earlier work 
proposition is a three-part entity composed of a “term”, a “predication”, and a 
“term”: pCs, where p and s are distinct non-logical “terms” and C is one of the four 
Aristotelian copulas.
25 For Aristotle’s categoricals and Boole’s equations, see Corcoran (2003). For Ockham’s 
categoricals see Corcoran (1981). For class inclusions, see Rosenbloom (1950).  For oth-
ers, see Łukasiewicz (1951).
26 These passages have benefited from discussions with Kevin Tracy.
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to quote but were for a long time laboring at tentative researches” 
(Sophistical Refutations 184b).27 But, as Aristotle also said himself, 
he did not write the last word on logic and the words he wrote were 
not all flawless.28 Nevertheless, many people who thought they 
were advancing on the subject were actually making it worse. And 
many people who thought they were correcting Aristotle’s errors 
were disagreeing with things Aristotle got right. In case after case, 
“criticisms” of Aristotle supposedly grounded in modern logic were 
authored by people who do not know what Aristotle did nor what 
modern logic is. 
The Buffalo Syllogistic Group helped to keep these and other 
issues alive and helped to keep the intellectual world aware of the 
fascinating and momentous issues concerning the nature and ori-
gin of logic, one of the central fields that might shed light on the 
nature of rationality.
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